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Racial Terror & the Attempt to Stop the Desegregation of Lamar State College of Technology 
A presentation to the Beaumont History Conference, January 10, 2004 
 
 
 The desegregation of Lamar State College of Technology in Beaumont was marked by 
racial terror. The clash at Lamar climaxed a protracted antidiscrimination campaign that 
developed during the Second World War, escalated in 1949 when Lamar grew from a locally 
supported junior college to a state-supported senior college, and turned into a court battle in the 
wake of the victorious 1950 Supreme Court decision in Sweatt v. Painter which opened certain 
graduate and professional school programs at the University of Texas to African Americans. 
While in the book Advancing Democracy my focus is on documenting Lamar’s desegregation 
and situating the Beaumont-based struggle for access and equity in higher education in a larger 
statewide and national context, in today’s presentation I will discuss one particular aspect in 
greater detail. Following the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 
racial terror was deployed in response to efforts to desegregate postsecondary institutions in 
various parts of Texas. Terrorist activity and mob violence was successful in blocking efforts in 
Kilgore and Texarkana, as well as in stemming the organization of lawsuits in other areas, 
particularly in East Texas. Beaumont, however, was a different story altogether. 
Following the Spindletop discovery, as historian Joe Pratt has well-documented, 
industrial capitalists introduced a mode of production that began to adapt preexisting productive 
relations and transform them into a distinctive set of social relations that redefined Southeast 
Texas as a petrochemical refining region. The process of adaptation and transformation was a 
fluid and contested process from the very beginning. At the heart of the social side of this 
process was crucial nexus of ideas and practices about race, place, gender, and socioeconomic 
class concerns. Interestingly, Lamar from its creation in 1923 as South Park Junior College, the 
second junior college established in the state, was a sort of weather vane blowing in the wind 
pointing out the direction of the winds of change and a barometer gauging the resistance for and 
against the status quo. In one remarkable statement, South Park’s first president Louis R. 
Pietzsch, in a speech before the Kiwanis club in June 1923, linked together the establishment of 
the new college, the oil industry’s boom, the weakness of labor in the area, and the Beaumont 
branch of the Ku Klux Klan as the secret source of the city’s outstanding success. “Beaumont 
has gained fame from its Spindletop oil field, from its open shop association, from its Ku Klux 
Klan, and,” he said the city “is about to gain more fame because of its new junior college at 
South Park.” Although by the end of the 1920s the Klan’s fame turned to shame, the under-lying 
motif of violent resistance to radical change especially as it concerned the emancipation of black 
workers from their status as a super-oppressed and exploited strata of the working class remained 
in force. Moreover, throughout the 1920s and well into the 1950s, the owners and managers of 
the Golden Triangle’s petrochemical industries continued to deploy violence, economic coercion, 
and some of the most brutal tactics imaginable to break strikes and break the back of the union’s 
that, albeit in the form of segregated locals, fought for increases in wages, benefits, and quality 
of the working conditions. Of course, black workers also had to fight both company leadership 
and white workers to end discrimination in wages and job assignments as Ernest Starks Obadele 
points out in his recent studies. I want to note here that a detailed examination of how the 
violence used against the labor movement in Southeast Texas is related to the violence used 
against the civil rights movement in particular and black worker’s oppositional culture in general 
is an area more than ripe for study. Diane McWhorter, whose book Carry Me Home won the 
Pulitzer prize for history last year revealed profoundly significant connections between Bull 
Connors and the Klansmen who bombed the 16th Street Baptist Church killing four little girls 
among many other acts of racial terror and violence against the black freedom struggle in 
Tuscaloosa and Birmingham with the owners and managers of capital who had for decades hired 
terrorists to disrupt and destroy unionists in the steel and coal industries. McWhorter had a 
unique position from which to document this connection as a granddaughter of one of the most 
prominent capitalists in the area and disarmingly charming journalist with full southern belle 
training. Her work holds out great promise that somehow, someday we might pierce the veil of 
secrecy and peer inside the ugly face of race and class domination at its most economically 
privileged and powerful center in other locations such as Beaumont. The story I have to offer 
today is told from the vantage point of black and white working class sources, and official 
sources like the press, court papers, Board of Regents papers, and the archives of Lamar’s 
president at the time of formal desegregation. I long for a Diane McWhorter to pop up in 
Southeast Texas and tell all.i  
Black Beaumonter’s Struggle for Access & Equity 
 While the rapid industrialization of Southeast Texas and the G. I. Bill helped to spark a 
tremendous increase in Lamar’s enrollment figures, black veterans of World War II that returned 
home found extremely limited opportunities for postsecondary education or vocational training. 
The only institution beyond high school open for blacks, a business school, had a poor reputation 
and district officials sought to close it. A group of black leaders calling themselves the Negro 
Goodwill Council had protested to Governor Beauford Jester about the dismal educational 
inequality in the city and the exclusion of blacks from Lamar State College. In 1947, when a bill 
appeared in the legislature to change Lamar into a state-supported senior college, the council 
attempted to block its passage. The group’s protest actions resulted in immediate action by John 
Gray, Lamar’s president. He promised the council separate facilities, and a year later, a black 
branch of Lamar called Jefferson Junior College opened with evening classes held at Charlton-
Pollard High School. Dr. Harvey Johnson, principal of the black high school, welcomed the 
creation of a black junior college.ii  
 Black integrationists, however, gave no support to the power holders’ belated attempt to 
equalize Jim Crow facilities, and soon after the Sweatt decision they made plans to kill Jim Crow 
at Lamar Tech. They fired their first salvo in 1952. In January, James Briscoe, a native 
Beaumonter and graduate of Charlton-Pollard High School, applied to Lamar. Briscoe’s parents 
were laborers and members of the Beaumont chapter of the NAACP. They courageously 
supported their son’s effort to prove that qualified blacks desired to attend the school and avoid 
the inconvenience of studying long distances from home. Briscoe, a student at Morehouse 
College in Atlanta since 1950, at the urging of his parents and the Beaumont NAACP, agreed to 
participate in the test case.iii 
 Initially, Lamar accepted Briscoe. The admissions office did not recognize from his 
application that he was a student at a black college in Atlanta. The school notified him that on 
the basis of his transcript from Morehouse, he was qualified to enroll for the spring term of 1951. 
On January 29, Briscoe went to Lamar with his acceptance letter in hand to register for classes. 
Aaron Jefferson, a grocer, charter member of the Beaumont NAACP, and a distributor and local 
writer for The Informer, accompanied Briscoe to witness the historic moment. Lamar’s acting 
president G. A. Wimberly met with Briscoe and explained that a mistake had been made and 
suggested he apply to TSUN. State law, he said, created Lamar for whites only.iv 
 Briscoe prodded the NAACP for action on his case even as his parents faced economic 
pressure from their white employers, as well as social pressure from their black neighbors who 
demanded that they back off. Archie Price, Sr., both the pastor of West Tabernacle Baptist 
Church where the Briscoes attended and principal of Hebert High School, opposed desegregation 
of the college. He warned the Briscoes that they would lose their jobs if they persisted, and with 
six children to support, they would be ruined. The prediction of the prominent preacher-teacher 
came true when the employers of Briscoe’s father fired him over the race issue. Many of the 
Briscoe’s neighbors also put pressure on the family, insisting on the premature nature of their 
attack on segregation and warning that white rioting as the city had experienced in 1943 would 
ensue. Some even ended all association with the family. At that point, key local NAACP leaders 
supported Briscoe’s decision to relent and not file a lawsuit. They reasoned that they had gotten 
the attention of members of the white political economic elite and should try to allow biracial 
negotiations to produce the final victory.v 
 The Beaumont Chamber of Commerce organized the sixty-member United Racial 
Council (URC), with a white chairman and an executive committee composed of three whites 
and three blacks. The URC shifted focus away from the desegregation of the college onto city 
parks and recreational facilities. Dr. Ed Sprott, leader of the local NAACP, deemed the biracial 
group little more than a learning experience: “For their first act, they picked two parks without 
swimming pools for desegregation, got the council’s approval and also that of the city 
authorities. Two days after issuance of the Mayor’s proclamation, the authorities reversed their 
stand. Considerable protest had arisen, including threats like ‘Blood will flow down the valley.’ 
Negro leaders, recognizing that if the top echelons of both groups could not work together, their 
only recourse had to be in the courts. Legal action was taken, and . . . . the URC never met 
again.”vi 
 The impossibility of a negotiated path to desegregation of Beaumont’s public 
accommodations and institutions became clear to black activists in the course of a suit, Fayson v. 
Beard, to open the city’s golf course and park facilities. With a victory in that case in 1955, as 
well as in court-ordered actions in higher education from UT in 1950 to Midwestern, TWC, and 
NTSC, after 1954, Sprott, Octave Hebert, and other branch leaders returned to the NAACP’s 
method of direct attack and successfully recruited seven black students to seek admission to 
Lamar. In the summer of 1955, two 1948 Beaumont graduates, Martin High’s Versie Jackson, 
who went on to attend Texas Southern for a year, and Charlton-Pollard’s Henry Cooper, Jr., who 
had studied three years at TSU, led the group. The branch’s education committee then wrote 
Lamar president Floren Lee McDonald and encouraged him to correct the “ser[i]ous injustice” of 
restricting attendance on the basis of “race.” In reply, Lamar’s regents granted the committee a 
hearing at its 23 August 1955 meeting.vii 
 News that the regents had plans to take up “the problem” of admitting black students 
quickly set off white resistance. On August 19, a group of forty-seven whites, mainly workers at 
Magnolia Petroleum Company and residents of South Park, a heavily working class 
neighborhood with a reputation for hostility toward black residents in the area, signed a letter 
opposing any attempt to desegregate Lamar. Addressed to the regents, it stated: “We, many of 
whom are students at Lamar Tech, and all citizens of Jefferson County Texas, do hereby appeal 
to you to rule against any integration of the white and colored races at Lamar State College of 
Technology. We believe in equal but separate educational facilities and we think that the 
NAACP is trying to usurp the power of the state of Texas.” Their appeal mixed the idea of racial 
hierarchy and separation with the old state’s rights argument.viii 
 A few days later, at 1:30 the morning of the regents’ meeting on the “Lamar Negro 
Issue,” a night watchman discovered a blazing fifteen-by-eight-foot cross laid out on the ground 
leaving an imprint burned into the grass south of the main entrance to the campus. Proceeding 
with the business at hand, the regents voted to deny admission to the seven black students. The 
regents declared that the state legislature created the school in 1949 for “whites only,” and for 
whites only it would remain. They added, that “an unprecedented growth in student population” 
did not permit Lamar to accommodate any additional student load. The regents pledged to 
reconsider the matter after it had time to take into future plans the additional student load black 
admissions might create. The board’s delaying tactics left the NAACP no other option but to 
resort to legal action.ix 
 When Jackson v. McDonald, as the suit to open the college was styled, came before 
Judge Lamar Cecil, the students and their lawyers had good reason to expect he would rule in 
their favor. Cecil, appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1954 to a newly created 
judgeship for the Eastern district, had recently opened the city’s parks and golf course to blacks, 
despite virulent white opposition. The Beaumont native, graduated from Rice Institute and the 
UT School of Law, and made ties to prominent Texas Republicans like former U.S. 
Representative Ben Guill and multimillionaire oilman H. L. Hunt. The relatively isolated 
minority party he belonged to shaped the views he held, and through it came his political debts. 
For his federal appointment he owed nothing to the socially conservative Democrats he lived 
among. Also, Cecil had never held a state or local judgeship or political office prior to his 
appointment. Such characteristics put him among federal judges of the moderate-to-integrationist 
type.x 
 Cecil did not hide his opinion on the desegregation issue from either side in the Lamar 
lawsuit. He wanted the regents and the students to reach an agreement and release him from 
having to issue a court order. On 14 March 1956, local NAACP attorneys Elmo Willard and 
Theodore Johns, and Southwest regional counsel Tate, filed a complaint on behalf of the 
students. The attorney general’s office filed its answer to the plaintiff’s charges on April 5, and 
offered no new defense whatsoever. Shepperd himself argued that Lamar’s statutory language 
established it for whites only. Also, the college was overcrowded and had made no plans for a 
sudden influx of Negroes. If the judge forced Lamar to admit blacks, he warned, as Price Daniel 
had six years before in the Sweatt case, of gloom and doom: “It is not well for turmoil and 
discontent to be aroused in a community nor between the races residing there by a too hasty 
forcing of a claimed right of two puppets dangled before this court by the operators of a national 
racial organization.” Taking a dig at Marshall and NAACP leadership, Shepperd added that “a 
liberty of choice in this regard should not be abolished just to appease the inordinate desires of 
those officers in certain negro organizations to chalk up a record of ‘victories.’”xi Judge Cecil 
was openly “critical” of the state’s answer. In May, the NAACP offered to drop its suit and agree 
that the students would waive enrollment in the summer session if the college would voluntarily 
desegregate in September. Lamar’s board knew it had lost but refused this settlement. Instead, it 
asked the attorney general’s office to get Cecil to render his decision as early as possible.xii 
 On 30 July 1956, Lamar’s Jim Crow admissions policy received its death blow. After 
brief testimony from Versie Jackson and Lamar’s president, Cecil took only a few minutes 
before announcing his decision that qualified blacks had a right to become students at Lamar. He 
stated that the “separate but equal” doctrine was no longer in effect “whether we like it or not,” 
and that he would “follow the Supreme Court” as long as he sat on the federal bench. Lamar 
officials, however, still refused to accept that the unconstitutionality of its “white youth” only 
provision. They sought a stay of execution of Cecil’s order, citing the need for time to solve local 
implementation problems. Although blacks had already enrolled, on September 25, Shepperd’s 
office filed both a notice of appeal and a motion for Cecil’s judgment to be suspended pending 
Fifth Circuit appellate court action.xiii 
 The regents’ deep-seated and publicly stated belief in segregation, their legal efforts, and 
delaying tactics did not deter white extremists but may have encouraged their activities. On 
August 1, six “hooded figures” at 9:00 p.m., set ablaze a twelve-foot-tall gasoline-soaked 
wooden cross. Police Chief Jim Mulligan suspected that Lamar students erected the flaming 
cross. On August 11, police found two more crosses burning in the vicinity of Lamar, one near 
the Baptist Student Center, and blamed them on “youthful pranksters.” At the same time less 
youthful white militants unleashed a campaign of terrorism against local black activists. 
Attorneys Theodore Johns and Elmo Willard, for example, received death threats and suffered 
damage to their offices. Other NAACP members also encountered cross-burnings, bombings, 
and shootings into their homes.  
Frances Lightfoot, who ran for mayor of Beaumont in 1956 and got the most votes in the 
first election and lost the runoff by a narrow margin, represented the mood in Southeast Texas of 
white hatred against blacks, especially those who advocated racial equality. “We don’t like . . . 
the mulatto NAACP leader in town” she told an undercover agent of the Anti-Defamation 
League of B’nai B’rith in speaking of Ed Sprott. “He’s got a mansion on the outskirts of 
niggertown,” she added; “somebody has tossed rocks at his windows. He may be leaving town.” 
The year of Lamar’s desegregation, 1956, represented a watershed event for East Texas, but it 
occurred at no small cost.xiv 
 On September 18, a “committee” endorsing the “continued segregation of the races” met 
with McDonald and submitted a statement urging officials to “not permit Negroes to enroll in 
Lamar Tech for the September, 1956 term.” Led by Charles Howell, future president of the 
Beaumont Citizens’ Council, the group asked the board to deny black admission pending the 
resolution of the appeal of Judge Cecil’s decision and to maintain segregation even in defiance of 
the federal court order. As evidence that such a policy would be in step with the desires of most 
Texans, the committee pointed to the “overwhelming vote” in July’s Democratic Primary for a 
referendum opposing the “mixing of the races in any tax-supported school.” McDonald replied 
that the college was doing everything it could to uphold segregation. After his meeting with the 
group, he wrote regent W. R. Smith and informed him of “a little effort on the part of out-siders 
[sic] to interfere, but up to now I have everything under good control.”xv 
 Massive white resistance to desegregation lacked organization and leadership with a 
clear-minded, strategic sense of the battle. Politically unsophisticated, the race militants engaged 
half-heartedly in relatively passive activities such as visiting college officials and opinion-
makers, gathering signatures on petitions, and writing letters. Their impulse tended toward 
violent resistance. They wished to drive terror into the hearts of blacks and thereby elicit the 
cooperation of white power holders. Walking the border between violent and massive resistance 
tactics and doing neither fully, the opponents of desegregation reduced their effectiveness. A few 
days after Howell’s group met with McDonald, another group appeared to protest the 
“integration of the races” at Lamar and had a petition with 160 signatures, mostly of people from 
the small, all-white town of Vidor, about ten miles east of the campus. On September 25, the 
second day of classes, Vidorian Eleanor Parker gave the petition to McDonald. It ended with an 
ominous warning: “Please remember what happened in our city back in 1943.” The petition of 
the Vidor citizens, who apparently had no problem claiming Beaumont as “our city,” represented 
a none too subtle threat that an attempt to end segregation at the college would ignite a bloody 
riot.xvi 
 Lamar’s governing board did not support violent resistance to desegregation, but it also 
did nothing to discourage massive resistance. W. R. Smith explained in a letter to another board 
member: “I am not sure whether we should or not consider the possibility of violence such as 
occurred at the University of Alabama. I am aware of the bloody riots between the two races. 
While I am absolutely opposed to violence in any form, I would hate to be a party to anything 
that might bring it about.” Smith gave as a rationale for going slowly that “if we proceed with 
too much speed we may do just this. The possibility of such trouble may require us to be a little 
more deliberate than otherwise.” His reading of the Alabama episode, however, may not have 
been accurate or truthful.xvii 
 Once the board understood the federal courts would demand an immediate end to 
segregation at the college, it still refused to prepare whites for the inevitable. It chose instead to 
continue to present itself as fighting what more than a dozen senior and junior colleges in Texas 
had already done. If it had spent more time trying to prepare the region for desegregation, Lamar 
officials might have stemmed some of the turbulence that marred the college’s transition to 
desegregation.xviii 
 Official figures released on October 1, in the second week of school, revealed that a total 
of twenty-six blacks had been accepted in various departments of the college as part of a record 
enrollment of 5,455 students. Lamar’s first black students included Harriot Anderson, Freddie 
Mae Bell, Betty Jean Booker, Alfred Briscoe, III, Mattie Lee Cobb, Lonnie Flanagan, Winona 
Frank, Edward Frank, Jr., Versie Jackson, Alice Jefferson, Theodore Johns, Jr., Herbert Joseph, 
Lillie Mae Joseph, Lexsee Nixon, Jr., Alvin Randolph, Lillian M. Rhodes, Jimmie Rice, Elnora 
Riggs, Robert Sampia, Clarence Sams, Hazel Thibodeaux, Vara Vincent, and Adam Wade. Most 
of them had attended college before and a few with official connections to the NAACP (like 
Johns), entered the college merely to make certain that the legal victory had not been in vain.xix 
As black students entered Lamar, the massive resistance movement desperately tried to create a 
lawless, riotous condition. McDonald requested the help of the Sheriff and the Chief of Police in 
averting “any un-necessary [sic] incidents.” He also met with student leaders and won their 
support for peaceful desegregation of the college. The president’s organization of a united front 
of faculty, staff, and students helped keep white extremism from gaining a foothold on the 
campus once the semester began.xx 
 The first day of class pickets appeared in front of most of the eleven gates that allowed 
entrance to the campus. Picketers also came and removed black students from classrooms and 
caused the police to remove others as a precautionary measure. The picketers were abusive and 
quickly alienated the majority of the faculty and student body. Unable to attract enough support 
to close the campus or keep out all of the black students, the picketers became openly hostile, 
insulting and jeering whites who entered the campus. History professor Ralph Wooster recalled 
how they referred to him and his colleagues as “scabs,” and threw things at one staff member 
who escorted a black student onto the campus. The picketers, he remembered, “seemed by their 
appearance to be lower-white middle class, because they were not very well clad; in fact . . . one 
of the ladies didn’t even have shoes on. These were real hillbilly types.”xxi  
 Into the second week of the semester the Beaumont hillbillies, as McDonald put it, “got 
pretty rough.” Picketers began making an attempt to stop everyone who entered the campus 
parking lots or driveways. The president reacted by having signs posted at all entrances 
prohibiting “loafing,” but police officers and two Texas Rangers he “quietly arranged” to come 
to Lamar refused to enforce the law banning loiterers from campus property. Consequently, a 
number of serious incidents took place. The picketers, McDonald reported in a newsletter his 
office circulated during the crisis, “beat up one negro while a police officer stood idly by. This 
happened on one of my parking lots. They broke a taxi cab’s window as it delivered a negro 
student and later the negro driver was found to have a pistol in his car.” Noting the biased and 
unprofessional policing of the campus, McDonald observed that “by Thursday it was obvious 
that the law enforcement agencies were not going to discontinue the insulting of any teachers and 
students, and I decided that public opinion was sufficiently crystalized [sic] in my behalf to go 
on the offensive. The Editors of the Beaumont papers agreed to help me and I blasted away at the 
lack of law and order in Beaumont in front page headlines.” The negative publicity, he averred, 
“brought the Mayor over to my side and he called in the Police Chief and told him to clear the 
pickets from the area. At 1:00 p.m. on Thursday the police drove about 50 picketers from our 
eleven entrances to the campus, arresting one. At 6:00 the pickets were back and the police again 
drove them from the campus, arresting three including Mrs. A. W. Lightfoot, one of the ring 
leaders.”xxii 
 On Friday, October 5, the day after the arrests, Lamar operated without pickets for the 
first time since classes had started. That night, however, crosses were burned on both the Lamar 
campus and in front of City Hall. Mayor Cokinos received numerous death threats and had to 
have twenty-four hour police protection after bombs were exploded at the church he attended 
and, in an apparent mistake, at the house directly behind his. Attorneys Johns and Willard, Ed 
Sprott, Octave Herbert, and other NAACP leaders also experienced acts of terrorism.xxiii That 
next week the picketing at Lamar resumed and continued peacefully for a week. On October 15, 
however, Mrs. H. T. Mercer of Vidor informed the media that her group had chosen permanently 
to end the picketing in order to concentrate on the organizing of a rally in Beaumont’s 
Sportatorium that ACCT President Basil Masters would keynote. Finally admitting defeat, 
Mercer revealed the strategy behind the picket movement in a statement to the Beaumont 
Journal: “Our one and only purpose in picketing Lamar Tech . . . was to show public disapproval 
and aversion to having negroes [sic] forced into our all-white schools, which is against the laws 
of Texas, the laws of God, and the laws of personal morality and personal freedom. When we 
dared voice our protest to Dr. McDonald, and our picketing of the college, we had faint hopes 
that the people of Beaumont, or a portion of its white population, would become conscious of 
their white blood and the danger threatening their children (and mine), and awaken to what was 
happening.” Mercer’s statement also indicates a mood of resignation that whites had become less 
vigilant in defense of white supremacy.xxiv 
 The council rally drew a crowd of over six hundred, many of whom paid one dollar to 
become a member of the new Beaumont Citizens’ Council. Not one of the women who led the 
picket movement at Lamar won election to any of the group’s twenty leadership positions. Only 
men, many of them the husbands of these women, took office.xxv 
 The demise of segregation at Lamar involved not only a racial conflict, but also a “class 
cleavage.” In 1956, “the falling common whites,” in Beaumont’s factories, refineries, and 
shipyards, reacted to what they saw as an attack on their economic status and the erosion of the 
social contract that guaranteed for all classes of whites their incontrovertible superiority over 
blacks. Bourgeois whites, like the Lamar regents, also loathed the assault on “Southern customs” 
that Jackson v. McDonald posed, but for their class, the imperative goal of law and order, forced 
them to permit a revision of the region’s social relations. Both bourgeois and working-class 
whites, however, feared that racially mixed education would lead to miscegenation. Frances 
Lightfoot explained the attitude of many Southeast Texas whites when she said, “We like niggers 
here. We like a nice sweet collie dog, but we don’t like ‘em in bed with us. We’ll help ‘em out 
whenever we can, as white folks have always done in the South. But just don’t let ‘em get uppity 
on us.” When she parroted Masters’ and warned that “if the white race doesn’t rise up, we’ll 
have a nation of mongrels in two generations,” she spoke not only for many white “working 
folks,” but possibly for bankers like John Gray, lawyers like W. R. Smith and J. B. Morris, and 
businessmen  like Otho Plummer. In her view “cafe society” whites, the “froth” of the city, 
deeply opposed desegregation but were spineless. The regents fought it in the courtroom, but for 
Lightfoot, when a critical sector of Beaumont’s affluent whites refused to help foment a crisis in 
which Shivers would authorize Texas Rangers to remove black students from Lamar as a public 
safety measure, their reluctance to take part in massive resistance amounted to a betrayal and a 
refusal to “take a stand.” She explained to Breed: “You take the upper crust—bankers, lawyers, 
and businessmen. I know them and I have yet to see one of them come out and take a stand. But 
I’ll be downtown and some of them will come up to me and say, ‘Mrs. [Lightfoot], here’s $10 or 
$1, take it and use it, but don’t quote me. I can’t afford to be in this publicly. We’re not fighting 
the niggers, we just want to keep our customs.’” Lightfoot resented upper-class white reluctance 
to openly fight to preserve Jim Crow. Her comments and role demand greater scrutiny.xxvi 
 Amid such violent, torn and confused conditions on campus and across the city, Lamar’s 
black students tried to attend classes. Lonnie Flanagan’s determination to enter the college met a 
severe test. At about 9:00 a.m. on October 4, Flanagan crouched down out of sight in the 
backseat of his stepfather’s taxicab, while Clarence Mason, a forty-two year old driver for 
Flanagan Taxi Company, drove in a circle near Lamar’s rear entrance, until a propitious moment 
arose for Flanagan to run from the car through Lamar’s rear gates to his class. Flanagan had 
successfully used this method the day before, but now he encountered sentries on the back gates. 
Passing near an entrance, Tom W. Sanford, a thirty-eight year old Beaumont fence salesman, ran 
out in front of the cab and motioned to Mason to stop the car. Mason slowed down and then tried 
to speed away when Sanford yelled to other picketers, “He’s got a nigger in the back.” Sanford 
dropped his placard, leaned into the car, and made a grab for the steering wheel trying to stop the 
car. As Mason dragged Sanford the distance of a “city block,” he drew his pistol and pointed it at 
the white man’s head. Sanford still refused to let go of the car. He later said, “I told him to go 
ahead and shoot, but he didn’t. He started beating my hands with the gun.” Mason finally 
stopped the car when a police vehicle with two of the fifty officers that patrolled the campus 
pulled in front of his car. The officers quickly took Mason, Flanagan, and Sanford away from the 
scene to police headquarters for questioning. Ranger Captain Johnny Klevenhagen kept Mason 
for special interrogation. The police released Flanagan from jail after he gave them a statement. 
His brother, Mansfield Flanagan, a twenty-one year old cab driver, had his rear window smashed 
after dropping off a black student minutes before the incident with Sanford. Police did not charge 
any of the white picketers for destroying Flanagan’s window, and the picketers did not press 
charges against him for allegedly “nearly hitting” two of their ranks.xxvii In another brush with 
violence, Alvin Randolph recalled driving along Port Arthur Road in front of Lamar’s main 
entrance and seeing several white female picketers chasing Lillie Mae Joseph into the road. She 
avoided a stoning, beating, or worse, only because Randolph stopped his car for her and drove 
her to safety.xxviii Such racial terror was part of a complex set of public narratives and meta-
narratives of race, social control, a certain imagined South, and gender. The history of Beaumont 
must grapple with the roots and the repercussions of this terror. Its genealogy and a basic 
conceptual narrative that articulates the key political and infrapolitical meanings of terrorism to 
life in the region must be written. Such a project is not about guilt, it is about guts—honoring the 
people who had the guts to defy terror to advance democracy. 
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